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COMMENT
EQUAL PROTECTION FROM
EXECUTION: EXPANDING ATKINS TO
INCLUDE MENTALLY IMPAIRED
OFFENDERS
"Once a substantive right or restriction is recognized in the
Constitution ... its enforcement is in no way confined to the
rudimentary process deemed adequate in ages past."'
In 2002, the United States Supreme Court announced that the
execution of mentally retarded offenders is unconstitutional,2
under the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment.3 This decision purported to provide absolute protection
against execution for such offenders, whom the Court characterized
as "know[ing] the difference between right and wrong and [being]
competent to stand trial . . . [but having] diminished capacities" and
a corresponding reduced culpability for their crimes. In practice,
however, the Atkins v. Virginia decision has allowed states to
narrow that protection because the Court failed to define the precise
group its ruling encompassed. By "leav[ing] to the State[s] the
task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional
restriction,"5 including defining the term "mental retardation," Atkins
I Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,410 (1986).
2 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
3 U.S. CONST. amend. Vill.
4 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318.
s Id. at 317 (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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shifted the debate from whether to execute mentally retarded
offenders to who qualifies as "mentally retarded." Not surprisingly,
this debate has produced definitions of mental retardation that vary
among the states.6
There is, however, one common element of states' mental
retardation definitions: the requirement that symptoms manifest
before adulthood. This Comment argues that the juvenile-onset
requirement is inappropriate in the legal context and arguably
violates the Equal Protection Clause because it requires different
punishments for similarly impaired offenders based solely on the
legally insignificant question of when their retardation began.
Part I provides background information on the Atkins decision itself.
Part II explores potential ways to define mental retardation, the
definitions that states have adopted, and the role of the juvenile-onset
requirement in those definitions. Part 111 considers possible equal
protection challenges to the juvenile-onset requirement, including the
appropriate level of judicial scrutiny and possible rationales a state
could proffer to justify the requirement.
I. THE ATKINS V. VIRGINIA DECISION
In Atkins, the Supreme Court held that the execution of mentally
retarded offenders is unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. To reach its
conclusion, the Court first sought and found a national consensus
against the practice and then brought its "own judgment . . . to bear
on the question of [the punishment's] acceptability."9
In the first prong of its analysis, the Atkins Court surveyed the
number of states refusing, either through legislation or actual practice,
to execute mentally retarded offenders,'0 and noted the "consistency
6 See John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson & Christopher Seeds, An Emprical Look at
Atkins v. Virginia and Its Application in Capital Cases, 76 Tenn. L. Rev. 625, 629-36 (2009).
7 This Comment uses the term "mental retardation" to refer to the clinical definition,
including the age-of-onset component, and the term "mental impairment" to refer to the
intellectual and adaptive deficits present in mental retardation, but without requiring juvenile
onset. Also, this Comment uses the term "mental retardation" because Atkins attaches legal
significance to that term. The phrase is, however, falling out of favor with the mental health
community and being replaced by the term "intellectual disability." See, e.g., Am. Ass'n on
Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, FAQ on Intellectual Disability, http://aaidd.org/
content_104.cfm (last visited Apr. 7, 2010) [hereinafter AAIDD] ("Mental retardation and
intellectual disability are two names for the same thing. But intellectual disability is gaining
currency as the preferred term.").
8 See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
9 Id. at 312.
10 See id. at 313-15.
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of the direction of change" away from the practice." The Court found
further evidence of consensus in the opinions of mental health
organizations, religious groups, the international community, and the
American public.12 The Court concluded that a national consensus
against executing mentally retarded offenders existed,13 though it
noted that "[n]ot all people who claim to be mentally retarded will
be so impaired as to fall within the range of mentally retarded
offenders about whom there is a national consensus." 4 As a result,
though it had already cited two definitions widely used by mental
health professionals,15 the Court declined to define the term "mental
retardation" and instead directed the states to adopt their own
definitions.16
To complete its Eighth Amendment analysis, the Court then
articulated its own reasons for finding capital punishment cruel and
unusual for mentally retarded offenders. The Court explained that
mentally retarded offenders possess a lesser culpability than other
offenders because of their diminished capacity to understand and
process information, communicate with others, abstract from
mistakes, learn from experience, engage in logical reasoning, control
impulses, and understand the reactions of others.17 The Court also
noted that mentally retarded individuals are more likely to act
impulsively rather than according to a premeditated plan and to
follow the suggestions of others in group settings.18
These characteristics, according to the Court, present two reasons
why mentally retarded individuals should not be put to death. First,
such executions do not serve capital punishment's penological goals
of retribution and deterrence. The severe level of retribution exacted
by execution is appropriate for only the "most deserving" offenders,
not those with diminished culpability. 9 Likewise, deterrence cannot
justify executing mentally retarded offenders because the same
characteristics that reduce culpability also "make it less likely that
they can process the information of the possibility of execution as
a penalty and, as a result, control their conduct based upon that
II Id. at 315.
12 Id. at 316 n.21.
13 Id. at 316 (noting that the execution of mentally retarded defendants "has become truly
unusual, and it is fair to say that a national consensus has developed against it").
14 Id. at 317.
15 Id. at 308 n.3 (outlining the definitions of "mental retardation" used by the American
Association on Mental Retardation and the American Psychiatric Association).
16 Id. at 317.
" Id. at 318.
' Id.
19 Id. at 319 (noting that "the lesser culpability of the mentally retarded offender surely
does not merit [this] form of retribution").
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information."20 Second, these characteristics increase the danger of
wrongful execution.2 1 That risk takes the shape of false confessions, a
reduced ability to persuasively show mitigating factors, an inaccurate
but prejudicial appearance of remorselessness, the risk that jurors
will view mental retardation as an aggravating factor of future
dangerousness rather than a mitigating one, and the inability to
effectively assist counsel and appeal to a jury.22 Therefore, finding
"no reason to disagree with the judgment of the legislatures that
have recently addressed the matter," the Court held that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits the execution of mentally retarded offenders as
23
an excessive punishment.
II. DEFINING THE BOUNDARIES OF "MENTAL RETARDATION"
A. In Theory: Possible Definitions
The Supreme Court's reticence to create a precise and uniform
definition has left states, lower courts, and litigants to grapple with
the question of exactly who falls within the exemption created by
Atkins. It is possible to define the group protected by Atkins in three
ways: using the clinical definitions of mental retardation; determining
exactly what group is the subject of the Atkins Court's national
consensus; or defining the group according to the Court's reasoning-
that is, including all who bear the characteristics described by the
Court in its rationale.
The first of these options, using a clinical definition, is relatively
straightforward and therefore attractive to legislatures seeking to
implement Atkins. The Court noted, but did not explicitly adopt,
24
two well-known clinical definitions of mental retardation. These
definitions, promulgated by the American Association on Mental
Retardation (now the American Association on Intellectual and
Developmental Disabilities25 ) and the American Psychiatric
Association, are largely identical and each contain three elements:
significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, limitations in
20 Id. at 320.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 320-21.
23 Id. at 321 (internal quotation marks omitted).
24 See id. at 308 n.3.
25 The organization changed its name and no longer uses the term "mental retardation,"
but stresses that "[m]ental retardation and intellectual disability are two names for the same
thing. . . . It is crucial that 'mental retardation' and 'intellectual disability' should be precisely
synonymous in definition and in all related classification because current federal and state laws
contain the term 'mental retardation."' AAIDD, supra note 7.
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adaptive skills, and a manifestation of these deficits before age
eighteen.2 6 The Court also noted that state statutory definitions of
mental retardation that were in place before Atkins generally
27
conformed to these clinical definitions, though with some variation.
The Court declined, however, to adopt either of these definitions,
instead directing the states to "develop[] appropriate ways to enforce
the constitutional restriction."
A second, and considerably more complicated, method of defining
the protected group is to include everyone about whom there is a
national consensus, the first prong of the Atkins analysis. The Court
found a national consensus against executing mentally retarded
offenders primarily in the number and trend of legislative enactments
prohibiting such punishment and in the rarity of executions even
in states that authorized it.2 9 It explained that these legislative
judgments "reflect[] a much broader social and professional
consensus,"30 as evidenced by opposition to executing mentally
retarded offenders within relevant professional organizations,
religious communities, the international community, and the
26 The American Association on Mental Retardation provides the following definition:
Mental retardation refers to substantial limitations in present functioning. It is
characterized by significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, existing
concurrently with related limitations in two or more of the following applicable
adaptive skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, social skills, community
use, self-direction, health and safety, functional academics, leisure, and work. Mental
retardation manifests before age 18.
AM. Ass'N ON MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION,
AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 5 (9th ed. 1992). The American Psychiatric Association's
definition, which appears in the fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders, is similar:
The essential feature of Mental Retardation is significantly subaverage general
intellectual functioning (Criterion A) that is accompanied by significant limitations
in adaptive functioning in at least two of the following skill areas: communication,
self-care, home living, social/interpersonal skills, use of community resources,
self-direction, functional academic skills, work, leisure, health, and safety (Criterion
B). The onset must occur before age 18 years (Criterion C). Mental Retardation has
many different etiologies and may be seen as a final common pathway of various
pathological processes that affect the functioning of the central nervous system.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 41
(4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR].
27 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 n.22.
26 Id. at 317 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Bobby v. Bies, 129 S. Ct. 2145,
2150 (2009) (explaining that Atkins "did not provide definitive procedural or substantive guides
for determining when a person who claims mental retardation 'will be so impaired as to fall
[within Atkins' compass]' (alteration in original)).
29 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314-16.
3 Id. at 316 n.21.
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American public.3 1 The Court acknowledged, however, that while
there is a national consensus against executing mentally retarded
offenders, there may not be a consensus about who is mentally
retarded.32  In other words, while legislatures, religious and
professional organizations, and the American public may agree in
principle on the prohibition, they may not agree on how to define the
protected group. And it was precisely because of the difficulty in
determining which people fall within the group about whom there is a
consensus that the Court declined to endorse a specific definition and
therefore left open the boundaries of the exemption.33 The Court's
refusal to settle this debate is a strong indicator that defining the
group using only the national consensus would be a difficult, perhaps
impossible, task for states and lower courts to take on.
Additionally, because the national consensus is not static, society's
belief regarding who should be -subject to capital punishment may
morph over time, leaving the issue open for litigation with each new
case. So while this definition may be attractive in theory, it could be a
logistical nightmare to implement.
The final option for defining the group that Atkins protects is to
use the Court's own reasoning for finding these executions cruel
and unusual, the second step in its two-part Eighth Amendment
test. Under this method, any offender who fits within the Court's
rationale for the exclusion would be exempt from execution. The
Court pointed to a number of traits that render mentally retarded
offenders undeserving of capital punishment: a diminished capacity to
understand and process information, communicate with others,
abstract from mistakes, learn from experience, engage in logical
reasoning, control their impulses, and understand the reactions of
others; and a greater tendency to act on impulse and follow the
suggestions of others. 34 A jurisdiction adopting this approach could
import these characteristics into its mental retardation definition,
defining it by their presence. As with the clinical definitions, this
method would require individualized assessment, using the same
intellectual and adaptive skills tests employed to diagnose clinical
mental retardation, to determine if a particular offender's deficits
place him within the scope of the Atkins exemption.
3' Id. 316-17 n.21.
32 Id. at 317.
33 See id. (observing that the only discord surrounding the propriety of executing mentally
retarded offenders revolves around determining which offenders meet the definition and leaving
to the states the responsibility of resolving that debate).
34 Id. at 318.
35 See, e.g., DSM-IV-TR, supra note 26, at 39-40 (listing several standardized tests for
intelligence and adaptive functioning).
930 [Vol. 60:3
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B. In Practice: Wholesale Adoption of the Clinical Definitions
In practice, almost every state allowing the death penalty has
adopted a definition of "mental retardation" that closely tracks
the clinical definitions noted in Atkins.36 Such heavy reliance on
these definitions is not surprising, given their relative ease of
implementation and the fact that the Court cited them approvingly,
thereby creating a "safe harbor" of sorts against challenges.37 These
definitions, however, contain a significant element that did not
receive any attention in the Atkins decision: the requirement that
symptoms of mental retardation manifest before age eighteen.38 While
some states use an age other than eighteen 39 and others require onset
"during the developmental period"4 in lieu of designating a specific
age of onset, all but one require that the condition manifest before
adulthood.4 '
C. The Result: A Definition Without a Legal Rationale
The age-of-onset requirement is relevant in the clinical setting
because mental retardation is classified as a developmental disorder,
or one that first becomes obvious during infancy, childhood, or
42
adolescence. A person who later develops the same intellectual
36 See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-753(K)(3) (2001 & Supp. 2008); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 5-4-618(a)(1) (2006); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1376(a) (West 2000); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 16-8.5-101(9) (West 2008) (using the term "developmental disability"); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 1-Ig (West 2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(d)(3)(d)(2)-(3) (West 2006 &
Supp. 2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.137(1) (West 2006 & Supp. 2010); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 17-7-131(a)(3) (Supp. 2009); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515A(1)(a) (2004 & Supp. 2008); 725
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/114-115 (2006); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-9-2 (West 2004);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4623(e) (2007); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.130(2) (West 2006);
LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.5.1(H)(1) (2008); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW
§ 2-202(b)(i)-(ii) (LexisNexis 2002); Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.030(6) (Supp. 2009); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 28-105.01(3) (2008); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 174.098(7) (LexisNexis 2006);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2005(a)(1)(a) (2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-26.2 (2004);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-203(a) (2006); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-15a-102 (2008); VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1(A) (Supp. 2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.030(2)(a) (West
2002); Ex parte Perkins, 851 So. 2d 453, 456 (Ala. 2002); Chase v. State, 873 So. 2d 1013,
1029 (Miss. 2004); State v. Lott, 779 N.E.2d 1011, 1014 (Ohio 2002); Myers v. State, 130 P.3d
262, 266 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005); Commonwealth v. Miller, 888 A.2d 624, 631 (Pa. 2005);
Franklin v. Maynard, 588 S.E.2d 604, 605 (S.C. 2003); Ex parte Woods, 296 S.W.3d 587, 589
(Tex. Crim. App. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 794 (2009).
3 See Nita A. Farahany, Cruel and Unequal Punishments, 86 WASH. U. L.R. 859, 881
(2009).
38 AM. Ass'N ON MENTAL RETARDATION, supra note 26, at 5.
3 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-9-2 (requiring manifestation by the age of
twenty-two).
4 E.g. NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 174.098(7).
41 Nebraska is the only state that does not require the condition to manifest before
adulthood. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105.01.
42 See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 26, at 37.
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and adaptive deficits that characterize mental retardation is not
classified as mentally retarded. As James Ellis, the attorney who
represented Daryl Atkins before the Supreme Court, explained:
The purpose of this third component of the definition is to
distinguish mental retardation from those forms of brain
damage that may occur later in life . . . from causes such as
traumatic head injury, dementia caused by disease, or similar
conditions. This distinction is considerably more relevant to
clinicians ... than it is to the criminal justice system.4 3
Even within the clinical setting, labeling a disorder "developmental"
does not create a rigid distinction. For example, the DSM-1V states
that
[t]he provision of a separate section for disorders that are
usually first diagnosed in infancy, childhood, or adolescence
is for convenience only and is not meant to suggest that there
is any clear distinction between "childhood" and "adult"
disorders. Although most individuals with these disorders
present for clinical attention during childhood or adolescence,
the disorders sometimes are not diagnosed until adulthood."
The Atkins decision, though noting the age-of-onset element in
clinical definitions, provides no support for transplanting it into
the legal setting. The national consensus the Court found relies
on legislative enactments, state practices, and the views of
organizations and the public. None of these components provides a
ready explanation for requiring a certain age of onset, and some
directly refute the idea that the requirement is part of the consensus
the Court looked for and found. For example, the professional
organizations with mental health expertise cited by the Court, as well
as several other prominent organizations, advocate against requiring
juvenile onset for the exemption and specifically acknowledge that
similar cognitive impairments may arise from other causes, such as
traumatic brain injury or dementia.45 While the American Association
43 James W. Ellis, Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty: A Guide to State
Legislative Issues, 27 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 11, I3 (2003) (footnote
omitted).
4 DSM-IV-TR, supra note 26, at 39.
45 See AM. BAR ASS'N, RECOMMENDATION AND REPORT ON THE DEATH PENALTY AND
PERSONS WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES (2006), reprinted in 30 MENTAL & PHYSICAL
DISABILITY L. REP. 668, 668 (2006) ("Defendants should not be executed or sentenced to death
if, at the time of the offense, they had significant limitations in both their intellectual functioning
and adaptive behavior, as expressed in conceptual, social, and practical adaptive skills, resulting
932 [Vol. 60:3
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on Mental Retardation,4 6 also cited in Atkins, continues to include
juvenile onset as a prong of its definition, the organization's amicus
brief focused on the reduced culpability associated with mental
retardation, not its development or cause.47 The group has also noted
that those meeting the intellectual and adaptive skills components of
the definition, but with a later onset after age eighteen, "do not have
mental retardation within the meaning of the clinical definition" but
may be entitled to the same protection as those that do.48
Additionally, the Atkins Court pointed to an amicus brief filed by a
diverse collection of religious organizations as another indication of
consensus; 49 it contains no mention of an age-of-onset requirement
and supplies no justification for it. Instead, the groups echo the
reasoning of the mental health community by focusing on the lesser
culpability of mentally retarded offenders. They summarize their
position by saying that "the death penalty . . . should not be imposed
upon persons with mental retardation because of their diminished
capacity,"so making no mention of when such deficits manifest.
from mental retardation, dementia, or a traumatic brain injury."); see also PUB. POLICY COMM.
OF THE BD. OF DIRs. & DEP'T OF PUB. POLICY AND LEGAL AFFAIRS, NAT'L ALLIANCE ON
MENTAL ILLNESS (NAMI), PUBLIC POLICY PLATFORM OF THE NATIONAL ALLIANCE ON
MENTAL ILLNESS § 10.9.1.1, at 57 (8th ed. 2009) [hereinafter NAMI PLATFORM], available at
http://www.nami.orgfTextTemplate.cfm?Section=NAMIPolicyPlatform&Template=/Content
Management/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentlD=45722 ("Defendants shall not be sentenced to
death or executed if they have a persistent mental disability, with onset before the offense,
characterized by significant limitations in both intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior as
expressed in their conceptual, social, and practical adaptive skills.").
46 Now the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities. See
Press Release, Am. Ass'n on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, World's Oldest
Organization on Intellectual Disability Has a Progressive New Name (Nov. 2, 2006), available
at http://www.aamr.org/content_1314.cfm.
47 See Brief for Am. Ass'n on Mental Retardation et. al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, McCarver v. North Carolina, 533 U.S. 975 (2001) (No. 00-8727), 2001 WL 648605.
48 Brief of Amici Curiae Am. Ass'n on Mental Retardation et al. at 17 n.8, Arizona v.
Arellano, 143 P.3d 1015 (Ariz. 2006) (No. CV-05-0397-SA).
4 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002).
50 Brief for United States Catholic Conference et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 21, McCarver v. North Carolina, 533 U.S. 975 (2001) (No. 00-8727), 2001 WL
648613 (emphasis added); see also id. at 14 ("Persons with mental retardation deserve special
consideration and compassion; with less understanding of the consequences of their actions,
they do not have the same level of responsibility as others."); id. at 20 ("Mentally retarded
persons by definition have subaverage intellectual functioning with concurrent deficits in
socially adaptive behavior. That is not to say such persons cannot tell right from wrong or
should not be held responsible for criminal behavior. However, the death penalty is the most
extreme sanction available to the state, and is therefore reserved for offenders who have the
highest degree of blameworthiness for an extraordinarily aggravated crime. How can an
individual who by definition is significantly intellectually impaired ever meet the highest
standard of blame required for such a penalty? It is not a simple question of knowing right from
wrong. It is rather an issue of proportionality and equity." (alteration in original)).
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The Court's own reasoning is similarly based on the functional
effects of mental retardation-that is, those deficiencies measured
through intellectual and adaptive skills tests 5'-without discussing
when those characteristics develop. The Court explains that the lesser
culpability of mentally retarded offenders makes their execution
a poor fit with the penological goals of retribution and deterrence
and enhances the risk of wrongful execution.52 This focus on an
offender's cognitive shortcomings at the time of and after the crime
suggests that, while it used "mental retardation" as a convenient label,
the Court may have intended to exempt all offenders with the
cognitive impairments it outlined in its rationale.
Even if the Court had no such intent, however, states would be
wise to eliminate the age-of-onset requirement from their definitions
as irrelevant to the decision's reasoning. The impairments and
characteristics described in the opinion-rather than the term "mental
retardation" and its clinical definition-are at the heart of the
substantive protection Atkins recognized and should rightfully define
the group it exempts. States would honor the substance of Atkins if
they eliminated the juvenile-onset requirement and instead focused on
the cognitive impairments that formed the foundation of the Court's
holding.
III. POTENTIAL EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGES TO THE JUVENILE-
ONSET REQUIREMENT
Litigants in the states that retain the juvenile-onset requirement
may have a viable claim that the mental retardation definition
violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. The
Equal Protection Clause prohibits a state from "deny[ing] to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws" 53 and
requires the government to treat similarly those who are similarly
situated." Because the juvenile-onset requirement appears irrelevant
under the legal rationale for exempting mentally retarded offenders, a
defendant who is functionally identical to a mentally retarded
offender but whose impairments did not manifest until adulthood
could challenge his death sentence as a denial of equal protection. As
James Ellis suggests, in "a capital prosecution of an individual who
met the definition of mental retardation except for the age of onset,
5' See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318.
52 See id. at 319-21.
53 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
5 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).
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principles of equality likely would require comparable exemption
from capital punishment."55
For purposes of an equal protection analysis, the two classes
that most mental retardation definitions create are mentally impaired
offenders whose symptoms manifested before the cut-off age, usually
eighteen, and mentally impaired offenders whose symptoms
manifested after that age. As an illustration, two brothers, one
seventeen years old and one eighteen years old, could suffer brain
injuries in the same car accident, resulting in identical cognitive
deficiencies. The younger brother has not yet passed the cut-off age
and is protected under the Atkins definition of mental retardation. The
older brother turned eighteen before the accident and is therefore
eligible for the death penalty. This hypothetical scenario begs the
question: is there any justification for treating them differently?
A. Level of Scrutiny
The equal protection analysis begins by determining the
appropriate level of scrutiny. This question has received very little
attention in the case law involving mentally impaired defendants, and
no court appears to have applied a heightened form of judicial
scrutiny. The default form of scrutiny, therefore, is a rational basis
review.
1. Rational Basis Review
Any classification is subject to, at the very least, a rational basis
review that asks whether the classification is rationally related to a
legitimate government interest. 57 Under this form of review, which is
generally very deferential to legislative decisions, a court would
consider whether the state has a legitimate reason for exempting those
with juvenile onset of mental impairments from execution but not
those with identical deficits that develop during adulthood.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana analyzed this scenario in State
v. Anderson, when a capital defendant challenged Louisiana's
definition of mental retardation as unconstitutional under the Equal
Protection Clause. There, Henry Joseph Anderson argued that the
juvenile-onset requirement is unconstitutional "because it fails to take
5 Ellis, supra note 43, at 21 n.33.
56 See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 ("The general rule is that legislation is presumed
to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to
a legitimate state interest.").
57 Id.
5 996 So. 2d 973 (La. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1906 (2009).
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into consideration that a person can suffer a disability characterized
by significant limitations in intellectual function and adaptive
behavior after the age of eighteen." 5 9 Despite the defendant's
assertion that strict scrutiny was warranted, the Supreme Court of
Louisiana instead applied a rational basis review, giving great
deference to the state legislature. 0 The court did so, it explained,
because "[t]he United States Supreme Court has made clear that
mental retardation is not 'a quasi-suspect classification calling for a
more exacting standard of judicial review.' 6  As support, the court
cited City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,62 a decision that has
generated considerable debate over whether the Court actually
applied a more stringent form of rational basis review to a law that
discriminated against group homes for mental retarded individuals. 63
The Supreme Court itself, however, has since clarified that disabled
individuals are not a suspect class and only the baseline review is
appropriate for their equal protection claims.64 The Anderson court
used this rationale-that mentally retarded individuals do not
comprise a suspect class-to justify analyzing, and denying,
Anderson's equal protection challenge to Louisiana's mental
retardation definition under rational basis review.
2. Strict Scrutiny Due to a Fundamental Right to Life
The Anderson court did not, however, address the defendant's
argument that strict scrutiny is required because the law implicates
a fundamental right.65 Even in the absence of a suspect class,
strict scrutiny applies if the law challenged under equal protection
impinges on a fundamental right,66 such as the right to procreation,
68 6
marriage, or travel.69 If a court were persuaded that a law defining
5 Id. at 985 (quoting State v. Anderson, 39-232 (La. App. 2 Cir. 7/29/04)).
6o See id. at 987.
61 Anderson, 996 So. 2d at 987 (quoting City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442).
62 473 U.S. 432.
63 See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 16-13, at 1444-45
(2d ed. 1988) (suggesting that "the 'rational basis' standard [had taken] on a new, more
penetrating character").
64 See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365-68 (2001).
65 See Anderson, 996 So. 2d at 986 (noting that the defendant's attorneys argued that the
law "deprives an individual of his basic right to life ... and cannot survive strict scrutiny").
6 Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976) (per curiam) ("[E]qual
protection analysis requires strict scrutiny of a legislative classification . . . when the
classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the
peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class." (footnote omitted)).
67 See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (noting that
procreation is "one of the basic civil rights of man").
68 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) ("The freedom to marry has long been
recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness . . . .").
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an exemption from capital punishment affects a fundamental
right, and therefore reviewed it under strict scrutiny, the exemption
for mentally retarded but not mentally impaired offenders would
be unconstitutional unless it were narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling government interest.70
Both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution explicitly protect against deprivations of life and liberty
absent due process of law.71 Though life can be considered a form of
liberty interest,72 it is more straightforward to inquire whether there is
a fundamental right to life itself and, if so, whether that right exists
for those facing execution.7 3
The Supreme Court appears to have long ago answered the basic
question whether there exists a fundamental right to life. As early as
the 1870s, the Supreme Court labeled life a "natural right[] of man"74
and explained that "[t]he [F]ourteenth [A]mendment prohibits a State
from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law . . . [thereby] furnish[ing] an additional guaranty
against any encroachment by the States upon the fundamental rights
which belong to every citizen as a member of society."75 Just a few
years later, the Court broadly pronounced that 'fundamental rights to
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, considered as individual
possessions, are secured by those maxims of constitutional law
which are the monuments showing the victorious progress of the race
in securing to men the blessings of civilization under the reign of
just and equal laws."76 Such sweeping language supports the
common-sense view that the right to life is an essential pillar
69 See Mem'l Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 254 (1974) ("The right of
interstate travel has repeatedly been recognized as a basic constitutional freedom.").
70 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (articulating the strict scrutiny
standard).
71 U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
72 See Daniel G. Bird, Note, Life on the Line: Pondering the Fate of a Substantive Due
Process Challenge to the Death Penalty, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1329, 1346 (2003). The Court
has frequently recognized certain fundamental liberty rights, and it could be said that the
exercise of the right to life is a necessary prerequisite to the exercise of, and therefore implicitly
included in, fundamental liberty interests. As one scholar has suggested, "[n]one of these
[fundamental] rights, of course, would have any meaning without the right to life." Ursula
Bentele, Back to an International Perspective on the Death Penalty as Cruel Punishment: The
Example of South Africa, 73 TUL. L. REv. 251, 288 (1998).
73 Finding that capital defendants or offenders have a right to life does not, in itself, mean
that capital punishment is impermissible. It simply means that the punishment and procedure
must satisfy strict scrutiny to comport with the Constitution's due process and equal protection
requirements.
74 United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875).
7s Id. at 554 (emphasis added).
76 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (emphasis added).
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in American society. Since then, the Court has continued to refer to
life, often alongside liberty, as a fundamental right in a variety of
contexts.7 7
Lower courts and legal scholars also recognize the existence of a
fundamental right to life. One federal appeals court, for example,
found that the Due Process Clause explicitly recognizes a right to
life and that Supreme Court precedent designates this right as
fundamental. 8  The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court was
equally unwavering in its recognition of life as a fundamental right:
We believe that the right to life is fundamental and, further,
that this proposition is not open to serious debate. Aside from
its prominent place in the due process clause [of the United
States Constitution] itself, the right to life is the basis of
all other rights and in the absence of life other rights do not
exist. . . . A denial of this fundamental concept would be
tantamount to a denial of human existence.79
Many legal scholars are in accord, with one asserting that "the Court
would have difficulty in plausibly declaring life to be less than
fundamental."so It appears, then, that "there is no doubt life is an
inherent and fundamental right.""
A seemingly more complicated question is whether those
sentenced to death retain this fundamental right to life. The Supreme
Court has noted that a capital conviction "single[s] out and strip[s]
77 See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281 (1990) (withdrawal of
life-sustaining treatment); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156-57 (1973) (abortion); W. Va. State
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) (requirement to salute the American flag and
recite the pledge of allegiance in public schools); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 582
(1896) (discrimination in selection of jury members); Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678,
685 (1888) (state prohibition on the manufacture of imitation butter).
78 See Mattis v. Schnarr, 547 F.2d 1007, 1017-18 (8th Cir. 1976) (en banc) (citing Roe,
410 U.S. at 157; Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 123 (1945) (Rutledge, J., concurring);
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938); and Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 370); see also Pleasant v.
Zamieski, 895 F.2d 272, 276 n.2 (6th Cir. 1990) (noting the Court's mandate that all seizures be
analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's "reasonableness" standard and observing that such an
imperative "presumably . . . preserve[s] [F]ourteenth [A]mendment substantive due process
analysis for those instances in which a free citizen is denied his or her constitutional right to life
through [other] means").
7 Commonwealth v. O'Neal, 327 N.E.2d 662, 668 (Mass. 1975) (citations omitted).
80 N. B. Smith, The Death Penalty as an Unconstitutional Deprivation of Life and the
Right to Privacy, 25 B.C. L. REV. 743, 752 (1984); see also Hugo Adam Bedau, Interpreting the
Eighth Amendment: Principled vs. Populist Strategies, 13 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 789, 812
(1996) (citing life as an example of a fundamental right).
81 State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338, 1359 (Utah 1977) (Maughan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). For an in-depth analysis of the fundamental right to life under the Supreme
Court's Glucksberg formulation, see Bird, supra note 72, at 1346-60.
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[an offender] of his fundamental right to life," 82 but it is initially
unclear whether the Court considered the sentencing or the actual
execution to be the time at which a capital offender loses that
fundamental right. The ramifications of this distinction are great. If
it is the latter, the state may still carry out an execution, but the
process it uses must comport with the heightened constitutional
protection of due process and equal protection. If, however, the
fundamental right to life is snuffed out at the time of sentencing, a
state wishing to similarly extinguish a capital offender's life is
constrained only by more modest constitutional protections.
The Justices' opinions in Ohio Adult Parole Authority v.
Woodard83 explore this question and highlight both sides of the issue.
The case presented a civil claim by a death row inmate alleging that
Ohio's clemency proceedings violated due process and his right to
remain silent.84 Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by three other
Justices, considered the question of the condemned man's protected
interest in his life. He found that the offender only "maintains a
residual life interest, e.g., in not being summarily executed by prison
guards."85 Justice O'Connor, also joined by three other Justices,
responded sharply to that suggestion, saying that a "prisoner under a
death sentence remains a living person and consequently has an
interest in his life."8 6 Contrasting the death row inmate's situation
with that of a person sentenced to life imprisonment, she stated that
"[w]hen a person has been fairly convicted and sentenced, his liberty
interest, in being free from such confinement, has been extinguished.
But it is incorrect ... to say that a prisoner has been deprived of all
interest in his life before his execution."8 Justice Stevens, the final
Justice to weigh in on the matter, was unequivocal: "it is abundantly
clear that [the offender] possesses a life interest protected by the Due
Process Clause."88 He explained that the Court's precedent, which
asked whether a post-conviction proceeding "comported with the
'fundamental fairness mandated by the Due Process Clause,"' 89
demonstrated that a constitutional interest in life exists even after
8 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409 (1986).
" 523 U.S. 272 (1998).
84 Id. at 277.
85 Id. at 281.
8 Id. at 288 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
8 Id. at 289.
8 Id. at 292 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
89 Id. at 293 n.3 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557 (1987)); see also
Yates v. Aiken, 484 U.S. 211, 217-18 (1988) (holding that a state cannot refuse to apply federal
due process law on the grounds that it had authority to establish the scope of its own habeas
corpus proceedings).
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an offender is sentenced to death.90 Considered together, five
Justices-Stevens, O'Connor, and the three Justices concurring with
her-found that a death row inmate's fundamental right to life is not
extinguished when he is sentenced.
An earlier equal protection case, Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel.
Williamson91 provides further guidance. In Skinner, the Court
reviewed an Oklahoma statute that imposed sterilization as
punishment for certain repeated offenses.92 The Court, under an equal
protection analysis, applied strict scrutiny in reviewing the law
because it "involve[d] one of the basic civil rights of man"-namely,
procreation.9 3 The Court also emphasized the severity and finality of
the punishment to explain why strict scrutiny of a classification
implicating a fundamental right is not only permissible, but
essential.9 4
The Skinner logic applies directly and forcefully to mentally
impaired capital offenders. Skinner recognized that conviction and
sentencing does not eliminate an offender's fundamental rights or
the ability to mount a challenge to the unequal deprivation of those
rights. A mentally impaired offender, therefore, does not lose his
fundamental right to life at the moment he is sentenced to death.
Particularly for equal protection purposes, he retains a vital interest
in seeing that his life is not lost-that he is not executed-unless his
punishment comports with the basic requirement that he be treated
substantially the same as those who are similarly situated. Even
more so than in Skinner, the punishment here, execution, has "no
redemption for the individual whom the law touches.... He is
forever deprived of a basic liberty." 9 5 Justice Stevens articulated the
need for even greater care when assessing capital punishment's
deprivation of the fundamental right to life:
The interest in life that is at stake in this case warrants even
greater protection than the interests in liberty... . For 'death
is a different kind of punishment from any other which may
be imposed in this country. From the point of view of the
defendant, it is different in both its severity and its finality.
9 See Woodward, 523 U.S. at 293 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
9' 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
92 Id. at 536. The statute required sterilization for any individual convicted of at least
two crimes "amounting to felonies involving moral turpitude." Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
93 Id. at 54 1.
94 See id. (observing that sterilization "may have subtle, far-reaching and devastating
effects," in that it will deprive an individual "of a basic liberty").
95 Id.
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From the point of view of society, the action of the sovereign
in taking the life of one of its citizens also differs
dramatically from any other legitimate state action. It is of
vital importance to the defendant and to the community that
any decision to impose the death sentence be, and appear to
be, based on reason rather than caprice or emotion.' 9 6
It follows, then, that a classification that saves some offenders from
execution while allowing the state to execute others with similar
impairments necessarily implicates a fundamental right to life and is
therefore subject to strict scrutiny.97
B. Possible Justifications for the Age-of-Onset Requirement
To survive an equal protection challenge, the juvenile-onset
requirement must be, at a minimum, rationally related to some
legitimate interest. As the level of scrutiny becomes more stringent, a
state must marshal more support and have a more compelling purpose
for the classification. Some of the possible rationales discussed below
could therefore justify the distinction under the deferential rational
basis review but not the more critical strict scrutiny.
1. Distinguishing Mental Retardation from Other Disorders
The most basic reason a state could proffer for requiring
juvenile onset is to distinguish between mental retardation and
later-developing brain disorders, such as dementia or those resulting
from traumatic brain injury. Indeed, the onset requirement exists
within the clinical field precisely for this reason; for example, an
older version of the Diagnostic and Statistic Manual of Mental
Disorders explained that "[w]hen the [same] clinical picture develops
for the first time after the age of 18, the syndrome is a Dementia, not
Mental Retardation."98
96 Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 293-94 (1998) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-58
(1977) (plurality opinion)).
9 A related, but likely more difficult, argument a defendant could make is that he has a
fundamental right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Though the Supreme Court has
never discussed such a right in the context of an equal protection challenge, it has done so in the
context of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, calling various protections in the
Bill of Rights, including the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments, "fundamental
safeguards of liberty." Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341 (1963). This precedent may
open the door to the argument that the age-of-onset requirement of menial retardation is subject
to strict scrutiny because it discriminates in who it allows to exercise the fundamental right to be
free from cruel and unusual punishment.
9 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 37 (3d ed. 1980); Christopher Slobogin, Mental Disorder as an Exemption from the
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Several courts have accepted this distinction as a sufficient basis
for applying differing legal treatment based on when intellectual
and adaptive deficits manifest. In State v. Anderson, for example, the
Louisiana Supreme Court considered an equal protection challenge to
the state's age-of-onset requirement for its mental retardation
exemption.9 The court held that the state could differentiate between
those who meet the clinical definition of mental retardation and the
"far more diffuse and much harder to define" class of people "who
function at the same mental and adaptive level as the result of other
clinical disorders (including dementia caused by traumatic organic
brain damage) not related to developmental disadvantages."100
Similarly, in an involuntary commitment case, a California appeals
court found that an age-of-onset requirement for mental retardation
could be justified by the state's desire to distinguish "the mentally
retarded from the mentally disordered for purposes of capital
punishment."101
The logic behind this distinction, however, is circular. A
government cannot draw a classification merely to create two
groups; there must be some legally relevant reason to distinguish
between the two classes. According to James Ellis, the attorney who
argued Atkins:
This distinction is considerably more relevant to clinicians
designing habilitation plans and systems of supports for
an individual than it is to the criminal justice system, since
later-occurring disabilities, assuming that the disability
developed during adulthood but prior to the commission
of the offense, would involve comparable reduction in
culpability for any criminal act.10 2
Death Penalty: The ABA-IRR Task Force Recommendations, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 1133, 1136
(2005) ("[D]ementia and traumatic brain injury [are] disabilities very similar to mental
retardation in their impact on intellectual and adaptive functioning .... [The only significant
characteristic that differentiates these severe disabilities from mental retardation is the age of
onset."); see also supra text accompanying note 43.
9 996 So. 2d 973 (La. 2008).
1oold. at 987-88.
101 People v. Middleton, No. 0040565, 2009 WL 1816905, at *10 (Cal. Ct. App. June 25,
2009).
o2 Ellis, supra note 43, at 13; see also James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally
Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 414, 422-23 (1985) ("The origin of
[the age-of-onset] requirement is obscure, and its relevance to criminal justice is limited. ...
The criminal law generally will be concerned with the manifestations and consequences of the
individual's handicap and not the date of its origin.").
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The psychiatric community recognized the possibility of clinical
diagnostic definitions being misapplied in the legal setting,
warning that "[t]he clinical and scientific considerations involved in
categorization of these conditions as mental disorders may not
be wholly relevant to legal judgments, for example, that take
into account such issues as individual responsibility, disability
determination, and competency."103 It follows that the clinical need
to differentiate between mental retardation and other impairments
does not necessarily provide a legally significant basis for the
distinction.
The Louisiana and California courts' acceptance of this
explanation as sufficient, under a rational basis standard, reflects a
highly deferential form of review. The Anderson court went so far as
to acknowledge that the distinctions "can appear arbitrary when
applied in a legal context, which should require a principled basis
for distinguishing between" the two classes.'" It then justified its
decision on the grounds that "[a]ny rational system of classification
may produce seemingly arbitrary anomalies." 05 The Supreme Court,
however, has previously admonished, also in a disability-rights
case, that the government cannot "rely on a classification whose
relationship to an asserted goal is so attenuated as to render the
distinction arbitrary or irrational." 106 The Anderson court appears to
have disregarded the Court's warning. As such, it may have acted too
deferentially to the legislature, even under a rational basis review,
by upholding a classification that it acknowledged to be, at least in
some circumstances, arbitrary.'07 Courts would be more aligned with
the Supreme Court's warnmg against arbitrary classifications if
they required a state to justify its juvenile-onset requirement not
by the clinical need to differentiate between possible diagnoses but by
a legally relevant distinction between the groups.
2. Preventing Malingering
Perhaps the most frequently asserted justification for the
juvenile-onset requirement is to prevent malingering: by requiring
that an offender provide some evidence that he had cognitive deficits
early in life, he will be unable to feign mental retardation as an adult
t0 DSM-IV-TR, supra note 26, at xxxvii.
10"Anderson, 996 So. 2d at 987.
'
0 5 Id. at 988 (footnote omitted).
106 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,446 (1985).
107 See Anderson, 996 So. 2d at 987; see also Farahany, supra note 37, at 911 ("One might
disagree that even rational basis review could support such anomalous results, but it seems
unassailable that the distinction would fail heightened or strict judicial review.").
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simply to escape capital punishment. 08 Under a rational basis review,
this justification may be sufficient, as the government appears to have
a legitimate interest in assuring that only those who truly have a
diminished culpability escape the death penalty under Atkins, and
requiring juvenile onset appears to be rationally related to preventing
any such fraud.
Under closer scrutiny, however, fear of malingering appears
insufficient as a justification for the juvenile-onset requirement. First,
James Ellis has noted that "malingering . . . has not proven to be a
practical problem in the assessment of individuals who may have
mental retardation," as opposed to mental illness.'" If malingering
is truly not a problem amongst those claiming mental retardation,
then using the age-of-onset distinction to prevent it would not be
justifiable.
Further, the issue of mental retardation is litigated like any other
issue in a trial. An adversarial proceeding, rules of evidence,
qualification of experts, and other requirements provide safeguards
against inaccurate or misleading evidence. Just as these protections
ensure the reliability of all evidence that reaches the fact-finder for a
final weighing and determination, they can also provide for an
accurate determination of mental impairments without requiring
litigants to prove onset many years in the past. In light of these other
protections and the suggestion that malingering is not a problem in
mental retardation determinations, it seems unlikely that a court
giving close attention to the issue would find the age-of-onset
requirement to justify the narrowing of a constitutional protection.
3. No National Consensus
A state might also point to the fact that the Supreme Court
specifically found a national consensus against executing mentally
retarded-not mentally impaired-offenders as a sufficient reason to
distinguish between the two groups. Under this logic, the Eighth
Amendment analysis performed by the Atkins Court is sufficient to
distinguish between the two groups: society views one group, but not
the other, as undeserving of capital punishment. Alternatively, the
argument could be phrased as such: the two groups are entitled to
equal treatment in that they both deserve a determination of whether
m0 E.g., Commonwealth v. Vandivner, 962 A.2d 1170, 1187-88 (Pa. 2009) (explaining
that "the issue of malingering is also of concern" when discussing the rationales for requiring an
age of onset).
"0 Ellis, supra note 43, at 13-14. Ellis also observed that "[tihere are no reports in the
clinical literature indicating that [malingering] is a practical problem in the assessment of
individuals who are thought to have mental retardation." Id. at 14.
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their execution is cruel and unusual. The difference is simply that
mentally retarded offenders are protected under that analysis, while
mentally impaired individuals, with onset in adulthood, are not.
A litigant could respond to that rationale by arguing that there is
also a national consensus against executing the mentally impaired.
Although the Supreme Court did not specifically undertake such
an analysis in Atkins, one might argue that many of the Court's
findings in that case may in fact represent the existence of such a
consensus. The Court recognized that the legislative, social,
professional, and religious consensus it found "unquestionably
reflects widespread judgment about the relative culpability of
mentally retarded offenders, and the relationship between mental
retardation and the [death penalty's] penological purposes ... [and] it
suggests that some characteristics of mental retardation undermine
the strength of the procedural protections that our capital
jurisprudence steadfastly guards."110 The consensus the Atkins Court
discerned is that certain people should not be executed because of
their mental impairments.' The only lack of consensus the Court
noted-over the requisite severity of impairment i2-concerns the
degree of impairment and is unrelated to when those symptoms
developed. In fact, several prominent mental health and legal
organizations, including one cited in Atkins, advocate the removal of
the age-of-onset requirement. These groups argue that defendants
with "significant limitations in both their intellectual functioning and
adaptive behavior, as expressed in conceptual, social, and practical
adaptive skills," should be exempt from capital punishment." 3
The difficulty with the national consensus argument is that the
"clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary
values[,] legislation enacted by the country's legislatures,"ll 4 does not
demonstrate a clear-cut national consensus. Fifteen states and the
District of Columbia do not allow capital punishment at all," 5 a group
10 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002) (emphasis added).
" Id.
'
12 See id. ("To the extent there is serious disagreement about the execution of
mentally retarded offenders, it is in determining which offenders are in fact netarded.... Not
all people .. . will be so impaired as to fall within the range ... about whom there is a national
consensus." (emphasis added)).
"
3 See AM. BAR Ass'N, supra note 45, at 668; see also NAMI PLATFORM, supra note 45,
§ 10.9.1.1, at 57 ("Defendants shall not be sentenced to death or executed if they have a
persistent mental disability . . . characterized by significant limitations in both intellectual
functioning and adaptive behavior as expressed in their conceptual, social, and practical
adaptive skills.").
114 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989), abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304 (2002).
" DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY 1 (2010),
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf.
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the Court included in its national consensus count in Atkins and other
recent Eighth Amendment cases.11 6 Only one state with the death
penalty, Nebraska, does not have an age-of-onset requirement.117 In
total, then, only seventeen jurisdictions ban the execution of mentally
impaired offenders. Additionally, every state to act since Atkins has
included an age or "developmental period" onset requirement in its
statute defining mental retardation. 1 8 These figures suggest a trend in
favor of requiring juvenile onset, not against it.' 19
The Court also considers actual state practices, so a defendant
might be able to rebut these numbers and trends if he could
demonstrate that courts tend not to sentence mentally impaired
defendants to death, even when capital punishment is an option,
because the defendant cannot prove juvenile onset. 120 But without a
strong showing that states do not actually impose or carry out the
sentence, the numbers make it difficult for a defendant to successfully
claim that there is an objective national consensus against executing
the mentally impaired.
However, a defendant need not make an Eighth Amendment
argument. In bringing an equal protection challenge, the defendant is
claiming that once the law provides protection to one group, it cannot
deny protection to a similarly situated group simply because the
second group was not initially granted protection. In order to survive
an equal protection challenge, a law must be based on a legally
relevant distinction between the groups. For a state to claim that this
difference exists simply because the Atkins opinion named one group
but not the other would be a red herring because it fails to provide any
legal basis for the distinction. A state must instead assert that there
is some independent reason to grant protection to the mentally
retarded and not the mentally impaired, rather than collapsing the two
arguments, and constitutional protections, into one.121
116See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005) ("[Iln this case, 30 States
prohibit the juvenile death penalty, comprising 12 that have rejected the death penalty altogether
and 18 that maintain it but. . .exclude juveniles from its reach.").
117 See NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105.01 (West 2002).
1
s See Death Penalty Info. Ctr., States that Have Changed Their Statues to Comply
with the Supreme Court's Decision in Atkins v. Virginia, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states
-have-changed-their-statutes-comply-supreme-courts-decision-atkins-v-virginia (last visited
Sept. 24, 2010).
"
9 At least one Justice, however, has noted that such trends should not weigh heavily
because states will attempt to ward off litigation by taking shelter in the dicta of Supreme Court
opinions. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2668 (2008) (Alito, J., dissenting)
(discussing legislative enactments prohibiting capital punishment for all rape crimes after the
Supreme Court found a death sentence for the rape of an adult woman unconstitutional).
120 Cf Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 (explaining that the execution of mentally retarded was
uncommon even in the states that allowed it).
121 For a discussion of the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and how its
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4. Not Functionally or Cognitively Equivalent
The final rationale a state could offer for distinguishing based on
age of onset is that those who have a normal developmental period
but later lose certain cognitive abilities do not suffer from the same
functional deficits as those who never developed those skills in the
first place. That difference, if it could be shown, would directly
counter the concern that the two groups possess the same reduced
culpability. Such a justification could likely survive even strict
scrutiny, and may undercut a defendant's equal protection claim
altogether, because it indicates that the two classes at issue are not
similarly situated.
The problem with this rationale, of course, is proving it. A
defendant's specific claims will affect the state's ability to provide
such support. For example, a state can easily show that certain mental
deficits, such as memory loss, do not result in the same loss of
functioning as mental retardation. However, a challenge framing the
burdened class as those having intellectual and adaptive deficits
identical to mentally retarded individuals-in other words, satisfying
the first two aspects of the mental retardation diagnostic test-will be
harder for a state to fend off.
This is particularly true given that the scientific community
appears to lend credence to the notion that particular injuries or
diseases result in impairments like those of mental retardation. One
organization, for example, has found that traumatic brain injuries can
significantly impair information processing and communication with
others and can cause individuals to act impulsively rather than
according to a plan. 122 In addition, one legal scholar recently noted
that conditions as wide-ranging as traumatic brain injury, dementia,
autism, epilepsy, and bacterial meningitis can produce many of the
same deficits that the Court noted as relevant to its Atkins holding: a
reduced ability to engage in logical reasoning, process information,
communicate with others, control impulses, abstract from mistakes,
learn from experience, and care for oneself.123 A recent newspaper
article featuring soldiers who suffered traumatic brain injuries while
abandonment of an intra-jurisdictional analysis in Atkins created the possibility, for the first
time, that "its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence could create inequalities that might implicate
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment," see Farahany, supra note 37, at
904.
122 See American Speech-Language-Hearing Association, Traumatic Brain Injury,
http://www.asha.org/public/speech/disorders/TBI.htm#Top (last visited Sept. 24, 2010).
2 Farahany, supra note 37, at 886.
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serving in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan illustrates this point.124
The soldiers bear many of the hallmarks of mental retardation as a
result of their brain injuries: impulsiveness, difficulty curbing socially
inappropriate behavior, and an inability to associate actions with their
consequences.125
Perhaps most telling, however, is the recommendation of a group
of influential mental health organizations, joined by the American
Bar Association ("ABA"), that the age-of-onset requirement be
dropped from the legal definition of mental retardation. 126 The
comments to the ABA's recommendation explain that conditions
like dementia and traumatic brain injury are "very similar to
mental retardation in their impact on intellectual and adaptive
functioning except that they always (in the case of dementia) or
often (in the case of head injury) are manifested after age eighteen"
and that "the only significant characteristic that differentiates these
severe disabilities from mental retardation is the age of onset."l 27
As with any rationale, the showing required to support the claim
that mentally impaired individuals do not have the same reduction in
culpability as mentally retarded offenders depends on the level of
scrutiny a court applies. Under a rational basis review, a court would
likely defer to the state and allow it to make the judgment that the two
groups have different culpability levels without requiring much, if
any, proof. Any heightened form of scrutiny, however, would almost
assuredly require a greater showing by the state, particularly in the
face of scientific evidence suggesting that the two groups share the
same cognitive deficits that, according to Atkins, render execution
unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Atkins created an exemption
from capital punishment based on the culpability level of mentally
retarded defendants. The flexibility it gave the states to implement the
constitutional protection, however, has resulted in a narrowly-drawn
definition of which offenders are entitled to be spared that
is unnecessary and perhaps unconstitutional. The juvenile-onset
requirement used by mental health providers, while clinically
significant, appears to have no real place in the legal system. Though
124 Christian Davenport, Traumatic Brain Injury Leaves an Often-Invisible, Life-Altering
Wound, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/articlel
2010/10/01/AR2010100106339.html?sub=AR.
125 See id.
'
2 6 See AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 45.
127 Id. at 669-70 (emphasis added).
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few cases have addressed the constitutionality of these definitions,
states that do not alter their statutes to remove the age-of-onset
requirement will likely be forced to litigate the issue as it arises in the
future. Additionally, it is possible that these states will find their
statutory definitions subject to heightened scrutiny, forcing them to
explain why they have allowed a definition of convenience to trump
the protections guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment. A definition
based purely on the mental deficits, and accompanying reduced
culpability, that were central to the Supreme Court's holding would
better honor the meaning of Atkins and the constitutional protection
from cruel and unusual punishments.
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